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ABSTRACT 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) predict two very specific relationships between firm value and 
the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure, depending on whether or not the firm pays 
corporate income taxes.  Although there has been some testing of the implications of these 
equations, I have been unable to find anyone who has tested them in the exact forms specified by 
MM.  In this paper, the MM equations are tested exactly as specified.  The results of these tests 
indicate that neither the MM tax nor the no-tax valuation equations are accurate predictors of 
firm value.  Specifically, the value of the unlevered firm accounts for much less of firm value than 
predicted and the sign of the coefficient of the interest tax shield variable is negative, instead of 
positive as MM predict.  These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables for firm 
growth, earnings variability, and the existence of other tax shields. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ifty years ago Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) laid the foundation of the modern capital structure 
theory.  Specifically, Modigliani and Miller (henceforth MM) showed that in perfect and frictionless 
capital markets, where firms could issue riskless debt, firm capital structure was irrelevant.  That is, 
the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure did not affect the value of the firm and, therefore, firms did not 
have an optimal capital structure.  In terms of an equation, MM showed that  
 
VL = VU  (1) 
 
the value of a levered firm (VL) is equal to the value of the unlevered firm (VU ), where the unlevered firm is the 
same firm with no debt in its capital structure.  In this case, shifting a firm’s capital structure only shifts the cash 
flows that a firm generates between debt and equity holders without affecting total firm value.  When MM allowed 
for the existence of corporate income taxes, they got a completely different result.  They showed that in this case, 
capital structure did matter and that the value of the firm was an increasing function of the amount of debt in the 
firm’s capital structure.  The exact relationship was shown to be 
 
VL = VU  +  tD  (2) 
 
where D is the value of the firm’s debt outstanding and t is the firm’s average corporate income tax rate.  The tD 
term in equation 2 measures the present value of the corporate income tax savings generated by the interest paid on 
the firm’s debt (the interest tax shield).  In MM with taxes, firm value increases as the amount of debt in the firm’s 
capital increases and all firms have an optimal capital structure that is 99.9% debt. 
 
 A number of authors have attempted to test the validity of the MM theories with most of the tests 
concerned with testing equation 2 as corporate income taxes are a part of the modern business environment.  The 
results of these tests have been inconsistent.  For example, several studies (e.g. Friend and Lang (1988)) found that 
the amount of debt in the firm’s capital is inversely related to firm profitability and the variability in firm 
profitability.  The former result is inconsistent with MM as normally the more profitable the firm is, the more debt 
financing the firm should employ in order to maximize the value of the interest tax shield.  The latter result is 
F 
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consistent with MM as the greater a firm’s profit variability, the less valuable the interest tax shield generated by the 
firm’s debt and the smaller the amount of debt the firm should employ in its capital structure.  In a non-traditional 
approach, Graham (2000) attempts to quantify the tax benefits of debt financing by integrating the firm’s tax 
function over the amount of the firm’s interest expense.  He finds that the interest tax shield accounts for, on 
average, 9.7% of the market value of his sample firms.  Using the last term on the right-hand side of equation 2 (tD), 
he estimates that the value of the interest tax shield is 13.2% of firm value.  The difference in the two estimates of 
the value of the interest tax shield implies that MM may be overestimating the value of the interest tax shield.  Fama 
and French (1998) test for the effect of debt in the firm’s capital structure on firm value using a regression analysis.  
In their regressions, firm value is regressed on a number of control variables one of which one is the firm’s interest 
payments.  Fama and French find that the coefficient on the interest expense variable has a negative sign, which 
contradicts the prediction of MM’s equation 2. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 One possible criticism of the above studies is that none of them has tested MM’s theories in the exact form 
specified by MM (equations 1 and 2).  The objective of this study is to address this situation by testing MM 
equations 1 and 2 exactly as specified.  The first step in this process is to quantify MM’s calculation of VU  for the 
sample firms.  MM specify that VU  = X(1 – t)/RU where X is expected operating profits before interest and taxes and 
RU is investor’s required return for investing in the equity of the firm if the firm had no debt in its capital structured 
(an unlevered firm).  X(1 – t) is essentially the firm’s expected after-tax operating cash flow to the shareholders of 
the unlevered firm.  The difficulty with estimating RU for sample firms is that most firms have some debt in their 
capital structure and therefore, RU is not readily observable.  Use of the CAPM equation and the formula for the beta 
of a levered firm’s common stock will allow for the avoidance of this problem and the estimation of RU.  Using the 
CAPM, then RU = RF + (RM – RF)βU where RF is the risk-free rate of return (estimated using the average return on 
one year t-bills), RM is the expected return on the market portfolio (estimated using the average return on the S&P 
500 portfolio).   The beta of the unlevered firm (βU) is estimated by solving the levered beta formula  
 
βL =  βU(1 + (1 – t)D/E) (3) 
 
for βU, yielding  
 
βU  =  βL/(1 + (1 – t)D/E) (4) 
 
where D is the value of the firm’s debt and E is the value of the firm’s common equity.  Estimates of βU are 
calculated using estimates of βL, D (book value of long-term debt) and E (market capitalization) obtained from 
COMPUSTAT.  As explained below, t is assumed to be 35%.  All other data used in this study also comes from 
COMPUSTAT.  In the regression analysis to follow two variables will be used to capture the effect of the interest 
tax shield on firm value.  In some regressions tD will be used to measure the effect of the interest tax shield and in 
others the firm’s interest expense (I) will be employed.  MM show that tD = trD/r = tI/r where r is the rate of interest 
on the firm’s debt, therefore, using I to measure the interest tax shield is equivalent to using tD.  The only difference 
is the predicted values of the coefficients on the variables.  If tD is used in the regressions the predicted coefficient is 
one while if I is used the predicted coefficient is t/r. 
 
 In each sample year from 1998 to 2007, selected from COMPUSTAT were all firms for which sufficient 
data could be obtained to perform the empirical tests that are used in this study.  To reduce the effect of outliers on 
the empirical results, firms with an estimated VU  < 0, or an estimated βU greater than 1.8 or less than .2, or a 
negative book value of common equity were eliminated from the sample.  This left a total of 18,539 firm/years of 
data with an average sample size of 1,854 firms per year.  Table 1 contains the means of selected variables for the 
sample firms for years 1998 and 2007.  The mean total assets of the sample firms increased significantly over the 
sample period from $3,458 million in 1998 to $9,573 million in 2007.   
 
The sample firm’s mean total debt to total assets ratio (Debt Ratio), however, remained fairly stable over 
the sample time period (.241 in 1998 vs. .230 in 2007).  The operating cash flow to common shareholders assuming 
the firm was unlevered (Cash Flow) increased from $383 million in 1998 to $1,101 million in 2007.  Cash Flow is 
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calculated by subtracting income taxes from EBIT and then subtracting .35 times the interest expense from the net.  
The last calculation is included to adjust for the additional income taxes the firm would have paid if the firm was 
unlevered.  This calculation is based on the assumption that the firm’s average tax rate is 35%.  Since corporate 
taxable income over $75,000 is taxed at marginal rates of between 34% and 39% an assumed 35% average tax rate 
should be reasonable for most firms.  Average interest expense (Interest) has more than doubled over the sample 
period from $68.9 million in 1998 to $144 million in 2007.  The present value of the interest tax shield generated by 
the firm’s debt (PVITS) also more than doubled over the sample period from $370 million is 1998 to $904 million in 
2007.  In the MM tax model PVITS equals tD.  To estimate this for our sample firms we use the book value of total 
debt to proxy for D and assume a 35% average tax rate for each sample firm. 
 
 
Table 1:  Means of Selected Variables 
  1998 2007 
Total Assets 3,548m 9,573m 
Debt Ratio .241 .230 
Cash Flow 383m 1,101m 
Interest 68.9m 144m 
PVITS 370m 904m 
  m = million 
 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
 To test MM equations 1 and 2, we will use a series of regressions in which the value of the levered firm 
(VL) is regressed on various MM and control variables.  The value of a sample firm is estimated as total assets minus 
book value of common equity plus market value of common equity.  In this study, data from all of the sample years 
is pooled to create one data set that is used in all regressions.  To reduce the effects of heteroskedasticity on our 
analysis all variables used in the regressions are scaled by firm total assets and all test statistics are calculated using 
White’s heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  Additionally, a fixed effects regression model is used to 
account for any calendar year effects on the sample data.  Table 2 contains three regressions that employ MM 
variables only.  In all regressions, the t values of the regression coefficients are in parentheses below the regression 
coefficients.  In the first regression, equation 1 (MM without taxes) is estimated using Vu as the sole explanatory 
variable.  If equation 1 is the correct specification of firm value the intercept in the regression should be zero and the 
coefficient on Vu should be one.  Inspection of the estimated coefficients reveals that neither of those conditions 
occurs.   
 
The intercept is highly significant and while the coefficient of Vu is positive and significant at the 1% level 
but its value of .366 is far below one.  These results, along with the low R
2
 for the regression (.04), suggest that there 
are other variables besides Vu that affect firm value.  To investigate this, we next estimate equation 2 using two 
different specifications of the last term in that equation.  In the second regression in Table 2 our estimate of tD, the 
present value of the firm’s interest tax shield (PVITS), is used as a second explanatory variable.  Adding PVITS to 
the regression has little effect on the coefficient of Vu but raises the R
2
 to .1.  The coefficient of PVITS is significant 
at the 1% level but, contrary to MM’s equation 2, has a negative sign.  In an alternate specification, the firm’s 
interest payment (Interest), is used to proxy for the interest tax shield.  When Interest is used as the second 
explanatory variable in a test of equation 2 its coefficient should be t/r.  Assuming a 35% average tax rate and a 7% 
interest rate on the firm’s debt then the coefficient of Interest should be approximately five.  In the last regression, 
neither the sign nor the magnitude of the coefficient (-28.0) is as predicted by MM even though it is significant at 
the 1% level.   
 
The results of the last two regressions are consistent with Fama and French, who found an inverse 
relationship between a firm’s interest expense and firm value.  Henceforth, Interest will be used as the interest tax 
shield proxy in all regressions since its value can be observed and, therefore, does not have to be estimated as the 
value of tD does. 
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 Since neither MM equation seems to adequately explain the variables that affect firm value, a second set of 
regressions is estimated using control variables suggested by other authors.  The results of these regressions are 
contained in Table 3.  In MM’s models, it is assumed that firms have no growth prospects, which clearly is not the 
case for most firms.  To account for the effects of firm growth prospects on firm value, research and development, 
expenditures (R&D) are included as a control variable in the first regression.  The presumption is that higher R&D 
expenditures will lead to a higher future growth rate in the firm’s operating cash flows.  As higher growth prospects 
imply greater firm value, it is anticipated that the sign on this variable will be positive.  The coefficient estimate is in 
fact positive and significant at the 1% level.  However, the inclusion of this explanatory variable had little effect on 
the coefficient of Interest.  Another factor that could affect firm value and the coefficient of Interest is the variability 
in firm operating cash flows.  Generally, greater variability in firm operating cash flows would lower the value of 
VU and the firm’s interest tax shield.  To check this, the standard deviation in EBIT over the previous eight years (σ) 
is used as a control variable in the second regression.  The coefficient of σ should have a negative sign.  Contrary to 
expectations, the coefficient has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level.  Additionally, the inclusion of σ in 
the regression did not have a material effect on the coefficients of the other explanatory variables.   
 
 
Table 2:  M&M Variables Only 
Dependent Variable: VL VL VL 
Intercept 1.34c 
(30.0) 
1.88c 
(40.3) 
1.74c 
(36.7) 
 
Vu  
 
.366c 
(17.1) 
 
.389c 
(18.0) 
 
.426c 
(18.9) 
 
PVITS 
 
- 
 
-6.86c 
(28.3) 
 
- 
Interest - - -28.0c 
(23.8) 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Adj R2  
 
.04 
 
.10 
 
.09 
 
N 
 
18,539 
 
18,539 
 
18,539 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show that other variables, like depreciation expense and tax loss carry 
forwards, can produce valuable tax shields similar to the interest tax shield.  If a firm has sufficient earnings to take 
advantage of these other tax shields then they should increase firm value and have positive coefficients when 
included as control variables in the MM regressions.  These other tax shields may also reduce the value of the 
interest tax shield if firm earnings are not high enough to take advantage of the full tax shield offered by the firm’s 
interest payments.  Consequently, the inclusion of proxies for these other tax shields in the regressions may affect 
the coefficient of Interest.  To test this possibility two more regressions are run using depreciation expense (Depr) 
and tax loss carry forwards (Tax Loss) as control variables.  The coefficient of Depr in the third regression is 
negative and significant at the 1% while the coefficients of VU and Interest are little changed.  In the fourth 
regression, the coefficient of Tax Loss is positive and significant at the 1% level, again with no material effect on 
the coefficients of VU or Interest.  In the last regression, all the explanatory variables are included in one regression.  
This increases the R
2
 to .22 and causes the coefficient of Tax Loss to become statistically insignificant but otherwise 
leaves the results little changed. 
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Table 3:  M&M with Control Variables 
Dependent Variable:    VL VL VL VL VL 
Intercept 1.48c 1.67c 1.87c 1.74c 1.54c 
 (29.4) (33.6) (38.1) (37.0) (30.1) 
      
Vu  .416c .408c .523c .421c .503c 
 (19.4) (16.7) (18.2) (19.6) (17.3) 
      
Interest -22.0c -26.6c -27.5c -28.0c -20.6c 
 (18.9) (30.9) (23.8) (24.0) (24.4) 
      
R&D  8.13c - - - 7.89c 
 (12.9)    (12.6) 
      
σ  - 1.60c - - .898a 
  (3.02)   (1.90) 
      
Depr  - - -6.37c - -5.87c 
   (9.72)  (9.35) 
      
Tax Loss - - - .263c .030 
    (2.81) (0.25) 
      
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adj R2  .14 .15 .10 .10 .22 
      
N 18,539 18,539 18,539 18,539 18,539 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Since one year’s operating cash flow is a somewhat noisy measure of expected operating cash flow, two 
additional regressions are run in which the 3 year and 5 year average operating cash flow is used to compute VU.  
These average operating cash flows should prove a less noisy estimate of expected cash flow and give better 
estimates of the regression coefficients.  The results of these regressions are contained in Table 4.  Surprisingly, the 
coefficients on VU in the first regression (computed using the 3 year average) and the second regression (computed 
using the 5 year average) are significantly reduced in magnitude but still have positive signs and retain their 
significance levels.  No obvious explanation for this result comes to mind.  Nevertheless, the coefficient of Interest 
remains negative in both regressions, but with a somewhat smaller magnitude than in previous regressions.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) predict two very specific relationships between firm value and the 
amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure depending on whether or not the firm pays corporate income taxes.  
Although there has been some testing of the implications of these equations, I have been unable to find anyone who 
has tested them in the exact forms specified by MM.  In this paper, the MM equations are tested exactly as specified.  
The results of these tests indicate that neither the MM tax nor the no-tax valuation equations are accurate predictors 
of firm value.  Specifically, the value of the unlevered firm accounts for much less of firm value than predicted and 
the sign of the coefficient of the interest tax shield variable is negative, instead of positive as MM predict.  These 
results are robust to the inclusion of other control variables for firm growth, earnings variability, and the existence of 
other tax shields. 
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Table 4:  M&M with Adjusted Vu 
Dependent Variable: VL VL 
Intercept 1.70c 1.79c 
 (32.0) (32.6) 
   
Vu  .269c .167c 
 (7.68) (5.05) 
   
Interest -18.4c -17.8c 
 (20.8) (19.8) 
   
R&D  8.45c 8.58c 
 (12.2) (12.5) 
   
σ  1.95c 2.21c 
 (3.61) (3.53) 
   
Depr  -2.51c -1.50c 
 (3.76) (2.64) 
   
Tax Loss .003 -.022 
 (0.02) (0.17) 
   
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Adj R2  .17 .16 
   
N 17,831 17,752 
a = significant at the 10% level 
b = significant at the 5% level 
c = significant at the 1% level 
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